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The past two decades have been punctuated by large-scale natural events that produced huge losses 
whether related to hydrological, atmospheric, or even rare geological hazards. Over the second half 
of the last century, the total cost of such catastrophes has been multiplied by a factor of 15, clocking 
up economic losses of around 66 billion dollars per year during the 1990s (Benson and Clay, 2004). 
Among these phenomena, there are those that cause disasters, i.e., corresponding to infrequent 
events that have major consequences on the well-being of the region’s population, environment, 
institutions, and financial equilibrium. The predisposition of a region to suffer an infrequent natural 
disaster is measured by the event’s capacity to generate losses that exceed 1% of GNP, thus resulting 
in a slow, difficult economic recovery (Munich Re, 2002). According to this definition, geological-
related disasters stand out from other natural events: they represent approximately 15% of the world’s 
natural disasters but account for one-third of all victims and economic losses (World Conference on 
the Disaster Reduction, 2004). The 2000s were not spared either, with the Indonesian earthquake in 
2004, and the earthquakes in Chile and Haiti in 2010. Together, these two quakes generated losses 
of around 40 billion dollars, and more than 280,000 victims, i.e., 31 and 80% of economic and 
human losses caused by natural events respectively, even though earthquakes only represented 6% 
of disasters in 2010 (Daniell, 2010). After the 1995 Kobe earthquake that caused economic losses of 
178 billion dollars (IFRC, 2002), the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan is known as being the event 
that caused the greatest direct and indirect costs, on a level to match the scale of the earthquake 
itself (Mw = 9): a direct economic impact of around 187 billion dollars was estimated, while indirect 
sanitary, ecological and economic costs related to the ensuing nuclear disaster are expected to reach 
a long-standing record level. Such observations should serve as a reminder that although public 
policies are paying more attention to phenomena related to global climate change, earthquakes still 
remain the natural events that are most likely to have disastrous consequences. Unlike floods or 
storms that, although likely to increase in frequency and intensity in the years to come in parallel 
with the climate change, leave us time to analyze future scenarios, earthquakes are already causing 
huge disasters now. Looking from a different perspective, Brauman (2010) has analyzed recent years 
human emergencies from a medical emergency actor’s point of view and concluded that earthquakes 
pose the first order threat to human life that ranks far above acute climatic events occurring near 
densely populated areas.
The Mw 7.8 Kathmandu earthquake on April 25, 2015 has reminded us of the inequality of 
populations facing earthquakes (Coburn and Spence, 2002). Economic and human losses obvi-
ously not only depend upon the amplitude and severity of the seismic vibrations but also upon 
the quality of constructions and the financial investment put into direct efforts to design buildings 
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and to improve knowledge of seismic hazard (Ohta et al., 1986). 
In Nepal, the preliminary economic estimate predicts losses 
representing approximately 18% of its GNP (CEDIM Forensic 
Disaster Analysis Group, CATDAT, and Earthquake-Report.
com, 2015), which classes this earthquake as a disaster. The region 
of Kathmandu is exposed to a high seismic hazard (Sapkota et al., 
2013; Bilham et al., 2001). The earthquake on April 25, 2015 was 
a major event that followed on from a long series of events affect-
ing the region along the Himalayan ranges, each time causing 
numerous fatalities: e.g., the 1905 earthquake (Mw =  7.8) in 
the Kangra region of India, north-west of Nepal caused 20,000 
deaths, 15,000 deaths were accounted for in 1934 (Mw = 8.1) in 
the Bihar Nepal region (in the south-eastern part of the country), 
and the Kashmir earthquake in 2005 (Mw = 7.6) killed 75,000 
people. Low probability/high consequences events are still 
expected. These events can be at the first order compared with 
the black swan theory proposed by Taleb (2010), which illustrates 
a cognitive bias that leads us to the erroneous conclusion that 
rare phenomena will not happen. People and policy makers may 
pass over their existence because the return periods are not of 
the same order of magnitude as the time span of the human life. 
Moreover, if such events are identified, a monetary cost/benefit 
analysis of earthquake engineering practices may not be in a posi-
tive balance. Incorrectly considering these events as black swans 
can bring important effects in terms of protection, regulation, and 
resilience. In fact, only observation over periods longer than the 
characteristic recurrence time of the phenomena, i.e., on the scale 
of geological time, can confirm the non-existence of such events 
(Bilham et al., 2001; Bollinger et al., 2014). However, this is not 
feasible and, by default, our reasoning is built upon incomplete 
information, resulting in erroneous predictions. As time passes, 
we realize that we are getting closer and closer to the appearance 
of a black swan, particularly since larger earthquakes are possible 
with even longer return periods.
At the same time, the urban population in the Kathmandu 
valley has been increasing by around 3.6% per year (Fort, 2014) 
over the past decade, reaching 1.5 million people. Since the 
return period of major earthquakes is so much longer than the 
periods of recent rapid urbanization, and Jackson (2006) and 
Holzer and Savage (2013) proclaim that major catastrophes lie 
ahead. In the Himalaya region, Bilham et  al. (2001) projected 
the urban population growth to one of the possibly overdue 
Himalayan earthquakes with the same characteristics as the 1905 
historical earthquake that yields 200,000 predictable fatalities. 
Rapid urbanization also amplifies the risk of disasters due to 
the complex combination of demographic concentration, social 
exclusion and poverty, accompanied by ignorance of the risks 
(Fort, 2014). The physical vulnerability of the constructions 
that ultimately causes fatalities becomes all the greater as the 
migratory influx presses for new dwellings and infrastructure, 
resulting in a strong demand for large numbers of buildings to 
be erected quickly, often at the expense of quality and safety. This 
pressure thus results in an inappropriate use of space, a low level 
of compliance with regulations and a good practice that would 
minimize damage and operation interruptions, and fewer pos-
sibilities for transferring or smoothing the risk as consequence 
of the concentration of goods and decision-making bodies in a 
single city, which most limits country recovery.
Faced with this situation, and in an attempt to reduce risk, 
the city of Kathmandu, like many others before (such as Quito, 
for example), has been analyzed in terms of its seismic risk. At 
the initiative of GeoHazard International, and with backing 
from the World Bank and UNESCO, a seismic risk management 
project was launched (Dixit et al., 1998), with the objectives of 
educating the public, producing a seismic scenario to simulate 
losses and operational problems, and implementing an action 
plan to manage seismic risk. The concept of community for risk 
assessment and resilience improvement is largely discussed in 
social sciences (Marsh and Buckle, 2001) and these scenarios 
participate to this scientific concept. Like Corneiro (2006) who 
comments that funding is mostly devoted to enhancing numeri-
cal modeling of structures rather than to actual and effective 
solutions of reinforcements, we could question the wisdom 
of concentrating resources on modeling and representing 
phenomena rather than implementing building reinforcement 
actions. However, a study by the USGS claims that a 40-million 
dollar investment in worldwide prevention measures in the 
1990s could have reduced economic losses by 280 million dollars 
(Benson and Twigg, 2004). Other examples concerning natural 
disasters also provide favorable ratios [cost of prevention actions 
to loss-reduction benefits] of around 1:3. Scenarios enable the 
transfer of scientific knowledge in an understandable manner to 
local decision-makers and let populations to become aware of 
the risks and to realize that it is preferable to anticipate natural 
disaster rather than just to respond to a dramatic event. They also 
support the view of emergency specialists, who are increasingly 
insistent on the need to invest in preparation, prevention, and 
disaster attenuation, particularly in view of the disproportional 
amounts that international organizations are prepared to spend 
on emergency rescue and recovery operations conducted hur-
riedly. Moreover, seismic risk analyses are useful to study the 
best investment framework for the seismic retrofit of buildings. 
Several cost-benefit explorations for earthquake damage mitiga-
tion showed the attractiveness of retrofitting actions on buildings 
for long return periods events (Smyth et al., 2004). In general, 
such studies suggest that retrofitting is desirable (cost-effective) 
in high seismic hazard regions for all but the very shortest time 
horizons. These reinforcement investments are on average rela-
tively small compared to the repair and replacement cost of the 
physical damage subsequently avoided. The economic losses and 
fatalities following Nepal’s earthquake could have been largely 
reduced if retrofitting actions would have been taken in advance, 
which is certainly the most difficult action to take. The savings in 
term of economic losses and human casualties might have been 
enormous by investing a small portion of the global emergency 
aid to recovery after the disaster.
Based on the 1934 earthquake, the Kathmandu scenario 
(Dixit et al., 1998) predicted 40,000 victims, 95,000 people 
injured, 600,000 left homeless, and the destruction of approxi-
mately 60% of buildings. In spite of the intensity of the last 
April earthquake, observations suggest that the actual figures 
are substantially lower. We know that the uncertainty of the 
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ground motion prediction model controls the uncertainties of 
the risk model. The only ground motion record in Kathmandu 
from the Mw 7.8 earthquake yielded around 0.2  g, i.e., a 
relatively low value in comparison with the predictions used for 
the earthquake scenario. It is also characterized by maximum 
amplitude at a vibration period (about 2 s) far from most of the 
assumed resonance periods of the city’s buildings. Very often, 
seismic ground motions recorded during major earthquakes 
by seismic networks surprise seismologists and ask about the 
physical reasons behind them. On the other hand, same reasons 
are always claimed to explain observations as for Kathmandu 
(Goda et  al., 2015): the most vulnerable buildings suffer more 
damage, the poorest suburbs without engineering design are the 
most damaged areas, and design defects are at the origin of most 
of damaged buildings. However, when the Mw 7.8 earthquake 
was announced, based on knowledge of the Dixit et al. (1998) 
scenario, the scientific community expected a disaster at a similar 
scale as that of the Haiti earthquake of 2010. The Mw 7.3 earth-
quake located 25 km from Port-au-Prince caused an economic 
and human disaster, resulting in more than 230,000 deaths, 60% 
of buildings destroyed, and total losses estimated at 120% of the 
GNP according to the IMF. Five years later, the country remains 
dependent upon international aid and the political situation is 
still equally fragile, due to the postponement of the presidential 
elections, which are to be funded by foreign countries, threaten-
ing the autonomy, independence and democratic sovereignty 
of the country. The future remains uncertain for Haitians: most 
schools and universities were destroyed compromising the 
renewal of the country’s active population in the time to come. 
There are many similarities between these two disasters: in 
2010, the human development index in Haiti and Nepal were 
similar [0.45 for the former and 0.458 for the latter, source 
United Nations Development Programme (2010)], both had 
experienced considerable population growth over recent decades 
and seismic rates are equivalent in both countries. Once again 
the earthquake was not considered, as in the black swan theory, 
in the sense that several past earthquakes had already occurred 
while less densely populated at the time. Unlike Kathmandu, 
however, no exhaustive scenario had been produced in Haiti, 
and it is much too easy to postulate that this could be one reason 
for the smaller scale of the Nepalese disaster. Moreover, it is still 
too soon to fully understand what happened but this earthquake 
failed to entirely rupture the locked fault close to Kathmandu 
and a large earthquake appears to be inevitable in future (Bilham, 
2015; Avouac et al., 2015).
A different factor that may influence the resilience of a 
community faced with a natural disaster is the degree of corrup-
tion. Ambraseys and Bilham (2011) calculated that 83% of all 
deaths from building collapse during earthquakes over the past 
30  years occurred in countries that are anomalously corrupt. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 
2014) ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt 
their public sector is perceived to be. It is difficult to make an 
accurate link of the impact of corruption in Nepal in terms of 
building collapse but it is surprising to note that for these two 
countries with equivalent development index, according to the 
corruption perception index CPI of Transparency International 
(2014) Haiti in 2010 was ranked 146th in the World while Nepal 
in 2014 was ranked 126th. Corruption prevents that the money 
spent in the construction process goes to earthquake-resistant 
practices and at the end one wonders if the solution is rather 
to invest in education and training of populations as the most 
efficient solution for reducing earthquake disasters as described 
by Twigg (2009).
Over the last century, urbanization growth has dramatically 
increased the risk in seismic prone areas and many cities in the 
world have not sufficiently improved their resilience. In this 
context, we may indeed wonder about the need of producing 
catastrophe scenarios. In recent years, probability-based predic-
tion solutions have become more popular than deterministic 
solutions; they integrate all the uncertainties related to the 
phenomenon in terms of occurrence, including intensity and 
location, as well as the expected ground motion. However, 
practical implementation in a country like Nepal is problematic 
and so representing a specific event (i.e., deterministic approach) 
remains an essential vector of information and education. The 
shortcomings of seismic scenarios in that they may never suc-
cessfully predict the observed consequences of earthquakes 
(due to the inherent uncertainties of the hazard) may cause 
maladaptive behavior. For example, the Dixit et al. (1998) sce-
nario predicted more victims: as fewer were observed, as fewer 
were observed, it is a concern that the population may reject the 
scientific evidence and decision makers may lose confidence in 
such tools, while seismological analysis suggests that significant 
seismic risk remains (Bilham, 2015); however, these scenarios 
remain essential tools for risk management, preparedness and 
for increasing the resilience of communities. Based on these 
scenarios, local initiatives at the community level (Twigg, 2009) 
are launched, and their representation provides essential support 
for the long-term reduction of seismic risk in public policy on 
time spans that are much longer than political mandates. The 
full implementation of mitigation strategies must however face 
the challenges of insufficient resources, which is generally cited 
as being the major obstacle to any prevention policy. The role of 
scenario in determining impact level is a critical issue (Alexander, 
2000). In addition to our current investment in emergency meas-
ures, we need to increase investment in resilience, which in time 
will allow a reduction in relief expenditures and better means of 
ensuring the economic, political, democratic, and social stabil-
ity of a country. We need to ensure that investments in disaster 
reduction measures are on a scale that matches the risks and in 
developing countries seismic risk scenarios are still important 
tools in achieving this.
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